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ABSTRACT
Traditionally the identification and apprehension
of active serious offenders has relied on informa-
tion from the public, the targeting of ‘known’
offenders and current knowledge of offending
patterns. More recently, the method of offender
self-selection has been offered as an additional
identification tool, where certain minor infractions
have been found to be ‘triggers’ for uncovering
serious criminality — self-selection because the
individual has broken a law in the first place.
This paper details a police operation — ‘Opera-
tion Visitor’ (focused on visitors to a young
offenders’ institute, to explore whether minor
offences committed (either whilst at, or en route to
the institution) can be used as trigger offences to
indicate serious criminality. One-third of visitors
caught offending had criminal histories, several
considered serious active offenders.
INTRODUCTION — OFFENDER SELF-
SELECTION AND ‘OPERATION
VISITOR’
Traditionally the identification and appre-
hension of serious offenders has relied
upon: information from the public; or the
targeting of those already known (the ‘usual
suspects’); or by obtaining accurate intelli-
gence of offending patterns which can be
matched to the facts of individual cases.
Although the logic of these approaches is
indisputable and is not contested, serious
criminals are often apprehended because
they are detected in the commission of a
lesser offence, and something has led an
alert police officer to ask questions and
make checks which reveal the bigger pic-
ture. Famous historical examples include
the ‘Yorkshire Ripper’, uncovered because
he drove a car with false number plates, and
the notorious American serial killer, ‘Son of
Sam’, identified because he parked illegally
next to a fire hydrant. This paper discusses
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how we can make better use of a major–
minor offending link to uncover serious
offending and the part serious offenders can
play in their own identification.
Much of the literature on ‘criminal
careers’ (eg Blumstein, Cohen, Roth, &
Visher, 1986, Svensson, 2002) lends support
to the view that serious offenders are often
crime versatile, committing an array of dif-
ferent crimes, including minor as well as
serious offences. People who do big bad
things, will not cavil at doing little
bad things. Little bad things are often easier
to identify than ‘big’ (serious) offences,
which usually are infrequent and isolated
events.
By committing minor offences serious
offenders ‘offer themselves up’ for legiti-
mate police interest. In other words, they
‘self-select’, allowing further scrutiny of
their background, associates and activities,
which may reveal their involvement in
more serious offending. Such police scru-
tiny is legitimate because the individual has
been caught breaking the law in the first
place, reducing grounds for allegations of
harassment. The simplicity of offender self-
selection is that offenders ‘volunteer’ for
police attention. The difficulty is identifying
those minor offences which serve as the
best indicators of more serious offending.
Although still in its infancy, research in this
area has identified several possible minor
‘trigger offences’ that can help with the
identification of serious criminals.
In a study of illegal parking in disabled
bays it was found that one in five of those
relatively minor law-breakers had outstand-
ing warrants for the arrest of the vehicle’s
registered keeper, or other characteristics
which would have excited immediate
police attention (Chenery, Henshaw, &
Pease, 1999). A study of serious traffic
offenders found that those committing
offences repeatedly, were also the most
likely to commit mainstream crime, with
drink drivers twice as likely to possess a
criminal record as the average member of
the public (Rose, 2000). Indications are that
using specific road traffic offences as triggers
for increased police attention/investigation
often pays off in the identification of more
serious offending (see also Wellsmith &
Guille, 2005). This is not surprising when
one considers that most drivers are not
criminals, but most criminals are drivers
(West Midlands Traffic Division, 1997).
A recent study examining the relation-
ship between shop theft and burglary found
88 per cent of prolific burglars admitted to
committing shop theft, with more than 50
per cent doing it every day. The author
suggests that shop thieves would be treated
more fittingly as ‘burglars on their day off ’,
rather than just as ‘shoplifters’ (Schneider,
2005). Shop theft is easier to detect and so
the message is simple: catch more shop-
lifters and you will catch more burglars.
Although at present few in number, these
studies lend support to the minor–major
offence relationship and increase the impor-
tance of identifying which minor offences
serve as the most reliable trigger offences to
indicate the possible presence of more seri-
ous criminality. 
This paper details ‘Operation Visitor’,
which explores how the propensity for seri-
ous offenders to commit minor crimes
offers the police, and inexperienced officers
in particular, the opportunity to have a
major impact on their identification and
apprehension, by employing ‘offender self-
selection’ (eg see Roach, 2004). Focus is on
the issue of offender self-selection and how
it can be used, rather than on any specific
‘good practice’ example or project.  
Operation Visitor had several hypotheses:
● That a significant proportion of visitors
would have recorded offence histories
(some indicating offender versatility)
● That a significant number of visitors
would offend — either en route to or
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whilst at the Young Offenders’ Institute
(YOI)
● That a significant percentage of those
caught offending during the operations
would have offending histories and/or
were active offenders.
Therefore, if these hypotheses are suppor-
ted, Operation Visitor would further dis-
tinguish (or add support to) minor offences
which uncover serious offenders — thus
moving on the self-selection agenda.  The
method, findings and discussion of Opera-
tion Visitor and its contribution to offender
self-selection now follow.
METHOD
The research aimed to explore further the
offender self-selection hypothesis by focus-
ing on visitors to a young offenders’ insti-
tute (hereafter YOI) in Lancashire. Local
police officers long suspected that many
visitors to the YOI had criminal records,
were active offenders and were committing
various crimes either en route (eg car theft
and motoring offences) or at the YOI (eg
importing drugs for inmates). Of particular
interest was whether visitors caught offend-
ing during the operation for seemingly
minor crimes had histories of more serious
offending, thus facilitating an identification
of which ‘minors’ could be trigger offences.
Visitors to the YOI self-selected in the sense
that by visiting a penal institution they were
accepting prison security procedures and
police interest, particularly with regard to
S. 8 of the Prison Act 1952 stating the right
to search anyone entering prison premises
(space precludes a full discussion of the legal
conditions here; please contact author for
explicit details).
Operation Visitor sweeps were conducted
randomly once a month during official vis-
iting time, by a team of local police officers.
All persons during this three-hour period
were stopped on the only approach and
searched. As many names as was practically
possible were entered on the Police
National Computer and also the Lancashire
Constabulary intelligence system (Sleuth)
simultaneously, with matches noted. All vis-
itor vehicles were subject to an Automatic
Number Plate Recognition System
(ANPR) and an inspection by road traffic
officers looking for illegal defects. 
Although a covert police operation,
ethical concerns were minimised as far as
possible:
● Visitors anticipated being searched and
having to produce necessary documenta-
tion as a condition of entry to the
prison
● Although vehicle checks were unantici-
pated, all visitor vehicles were checked
without discrimination
● All checks (eg PNC) were conducted by
police officers/staff
● All visitors were anonymised for quanti-
tative analysis
● All further background checks of offend-
ing visitors were conducted by police
officers
● Confidentiality was strictly maintained
throughout the research. 
RESULTS
1. Visitors and their vehicles
The 12-month period saw 10 individual
operations carried out, culminating in a
total search of some 617 visitors and 210
vehicles. Visitor numbers varied little across
operations (see Appendix 1).
The mean age of visitors was 33.8 years
(standard deviation of 14.5 years with an
age range of 14 to 81 years). Visitors aged
14–20 years comprised the largest per-
centage (28 per cent).( Visitors under 14
years were not included in the study as most
were not subject to search). 
An analysis of visitor drivers according to
age showed that 78 per cent were aged
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31+ years, where 57 per cent of passengers
and 63 per cent of bus passengers were
found to be aged 17–30 years (χ2 = 70.67,
df = 3, p = 0.001).Table 1 above details the
visitor transport by gender and indicates
that although there were more female visi-
tors to the YOI, the ratio of male to female
drivers was 2:1.
Visitor demography appeared even across
all 10 operations and consistent with official
YOI figures for the previous year.
2. Total offences by visitors
The number of visitors and vehicles sear-
ched across all 10 operations was found to
be relatively uniform, with a mean of 61.7
visitors and 21 vehicles searched per opera-
tion (see Table 2 below). The operations
detected a high number of visitors commit-
ting offences (offending visitors). In total 58
offences were detected, equating to a ratio
of approximately 1 in 10 visitors found
committing a prosecutable offence — 25 of
which necessitated an arrest (see Table 2
below).
3. Types of offences committed by
visitors
A full breakdown of the 58 detected offen-
ces according to operation number and type
can be seen in Appendix 2 — in sum the
findings were:
● Almost a third of offences were drugs-
related (17 out of 58), giving a ratio of 1
drug offence to every 36 visitors. All
instances were for possession with intent
to supply ‘class C’ drugs to inmates (ie
cannabis). Those found with amounts
small enough to be considered for ‘perso-
nal use’ were cautioned, or simply had
the drugs confiscated. In sum, two out of
every three arrests during Operation Visi-
tor were for drugs possession with intent
to supply. 
● Motoring and road traffic offences
(commonly termed ‘process’ offences)
Table 1: Visitor transport and gender
Male Female Total
Visitors 223 344 617
Drivers 137 73 210
Passengers 116 246 362
Bus Passengers 16 17 33
Pedestrians 4 8 12
Table 2: A table showing the dates, visitors stopped and the total number of offences
identified during Operation Visitor
Operation
Number
Date Number of
vehicles stopped
Number of
visitors searched
Prosecutable
offences detected
Number of arrests
1 26/04/04 23 61 17 11
2 04/05/04 15 43 2 0
3 13/05/04 21 60 7 2 (plus caution)
4 04/06/04 18 57 7 2
5 30/09/04 25 76 3 1
6 28/10/04 24 75 12 5
7 11/01/05 20 58 4 1 (plus caution)
8 13/01/05 26 57 2 0
9 03/03/05 22 60 3 3
10 17/03/05 16 70 1 0
Total 210 617 58 25
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accounted for over 58 per cent of offen-
ces committed by visitors. These
included:
● 2 Visitors Driving whilst disqualified
● 16 Fixed Penalty Notices (FPN), for
example not having valid motor insur-
ance or vehicle tax
● 11 Vehicle Defect Rectification Notices
(VDR) for vehicles with minor
defects
● 5 vehicle prohibition notices (Pg9) where
vehicles are confiscated on the spot
because they are deemed un-
roadworthy.
The remainder (‘other’ category) com-
prised a remaining seven offences —
visitors were arrested for the following: 
● 3 arrested for the suspected theft of a
credit card found whilst the vehicle
was searched
● 4 visitors were wanted on warrant by
another police force (2 for auto-theft,
1 for theft and 1 unknown) and were
duly arrested.  
4. Visitor offenders
As a result of visitor recording problems the
complete details of 45 visitors found
offending were recorded from a total of 58
offences. The major attraction of self-
selection is its focus on the actions of indi-
viduals (ie the breaking of a specific law)
rather than on discriminatory variables such
as race and gender. Therefore, only a rudi-
mentary analysis of offending visitors across
the variables of age, gender and mode of
transport is presented here (further details
available from author).
Age
The mean age of visitors found offending
was 31.6 years (standard deviation 10.9 with
a range of 17–55 years).  Analysis of visitor
age and whether an offence was committed
identifies an age distinction, with a majority
of offences perpetrated by visitors 21–30
and 41–50 years, but this did not prove
statistically significant. However, when the
age bands were collapsed further into two
groups (17–30 years and 31+ years), find-
ings were more acute, with 74 per cent of
drug offences perpetrated by those aged
17–30 years and 71 per cent of motor/road
traffic offences perpetrated by those aged
31+ years. This association was statistically
significant (χ2 = 8.39, df = 1, p = 0.004).
It was perhaps not overly surprising that
it was the 41–50 years age group of drivers
who were found committing the majority
of process offences, No statistically signifi-
cant relationship was found between age
and PNC marker (discussed below).
Gender
A statistically significant relationship was
found between visitor gender and the com-
mission of an offence — male visitors
committing two-thirds of all offences (χ2 =
9.38, df = 1, p = 0.002). For visitors overall
this represents an offending ratio of 1:9
males but only 1:25  females.
A statistically significant relationship was
also found between visitor gender and PNC
marker, with over two-thirds of those with
a discernible PNC marker being male (χ2 =
9.25, df = 1, p = 0.002). However, a
statistically significant relationship was not
found between gender and offence type,
indicating that female visitors — although
committing fewer offences than their male
counterparts proportionally — committed
the same mix of offences, namely motoring
and drugs.
Visitor transport
As can be seen from Table 3 on the follow-
ing page, drivers committed two-thirds of
all the offences, with the remaining third by
passengers. Curiously, none of the 33 bus
passengers was found to have committed
an offence. A brief summary of offending
visitor transport follows:
Drivers — visitor drivers committed sig-
nificantly more motoring offences than any
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other offence type — 85 per cent of all
offences by drivers were driving offences.
With respect to the total number of visitor
drivers, the ratio of offending to non-
offending drivers was 1:5. The ratio of
visitor drivers committing solely a motoring
offence (as defined previously) as opposed
to those not committing an offence was
approximately 1:6. This is thought to be
considerably higher than would be found
amongst the general population. A recent
study by the Jill Dando Institute of Crime
Sciences (2004) estimated that the ratio of
illegal to legal cars on the road was 1:20, but
this does not take account of all driving
offences, concentrating more specifically on
road-tax and motoring insurance infrac-
tions. Nevertheless, the high number of
driving offences found as a result of Opera-
tion Visitor suggests a higher prevalence
rate for prison visitors than the general
populace.  There were no drivers found to
be travelling in stolen cars.
Passengers — mainly travelling with visi-
tor drivers, but extended to include also
those travelling by taxi. As can be seen from
Table 3 above, passengers were responsible
for committing a vast majority of drug
offences, indeed over 70 per cent of pas-
senger offences were for ‘drugs possession
with intent to supply’. Three visitor pas-
sengers were wanted on warrant by another
police force and a further two more were
arrested on suspicion of the theft of a credit
card. In terms of all visitor passengers, the
ratio of those committing an offence as
opposed to those not, was approximately
1:20. The number of those committing
a drug offence was approximately 1:28
visitors. 
Of course, comparison of offending visi-
tor drivers and passengers must discount the
latter from motoring offences. However,
drug offence ratios for these two groups are
comparable with the ratio of those pas-
sengers committing a drug offence as
opposed to those not, found to be twice
as high as for drivers (1:28 and 1:52
respectively). 
Bus passengers — as noted, no bus pas-
sengers were found committing an offence
(all were subject to the same search proce-
dures as drivers and their passengers). This is
curious, when 63 per cent of those traveling
by bus were aged 14–30 years, the big-
gest offending age group found for drugs
offences during Operation Visitor. 
Pedestrians — from a total of 12, only one
pedestrian was found offending — a
20-year-old male, caught in possession of
cannabis.
5. Visitor offending histories and
current offending
Where practical, visitor names, addresses
and vehicles were checked on the Police
National Computer (PNC). Although,
where a visitor had a historic marker on the
PNC it did not necessarily imply that they
were criminally active, it was felt that this
gave an overall indication of the type of
offence histories which visitors had, which
could then be matched to offences detected
by Operation Visitor — testing the major–
minor offending link. It was anticipated that
checks would identify active, prolific and
serious offender visitors (eg four had war-
rants out for their arrest!). As many visitors
as was practically possible were PNC
checked — a total of 63 per cent. Of those,
62 per cent produced a definite result
where the visitor clearly either had a PNC
Table 3: Visitor transport and offences
committed
Visitors Drugs Motoring Warrant Theft Total
Drivers 4 33 1 1 39
Passengers 13 0 3 2 18
Pedestrians 1 0 0 0 1
Bus 0 0 0 0 0
18 33 4 3 58
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marker or not (the remaining 38  per cent
of visitors were either not checked for
practical complications (eg a ‘log jam’ of
requests at the control centre) or a PNC
search returned an ambiguous result). 
Although only 62 per cent of visitors
produced a definite PNC check result, 26
per cent of those were found to have a
marker for a previous offence and 36 per
cent were ‘unknown’ (not on record). This
equates to a ratio of one in every two-and-
a-half visitors having a PNC marker (crimi-
nal record). Either way this finding provides
empirical support for the hypothesis that
offenders — or at least previous offenders
— often visit prisoners. It needs reiterating
that of course because a visitor has com-
mitted a previous offence — recorded on
the PNC (ie they have a record), does not
make them ‘criminally active’, as this would
be unfair to those that have either put their
offending ways behind them, or have only
ever committed one offence. 
Of those found committing offences
during Operation Visitor, 30 per cent were
found to have markers on the PNC, which
proved statistically significant when com-
pared with non-offending visitors (χ2 =
11.258, df = 2, p =0 .04) suggesting that a
significant number of visitors caught
offending during the operations, had a his-
tory of offending — however distant.
Although this finding that a significant
number (30 per cent) of visitors caught
offending during Operation Visitor had
offending histories is important, it does not
tell us if these individuals were still crimi-
nally active, serious offenders. The next
section looks more specifically at how we
might utilise this finding in order to identify
serious offenders, from such relatively
minor infractions, such as motoring ‘pro-
cess’ offences and class C drugs possession.
Although only 45 per cent of visitors
were male, a cross-tabulation of visitor
gender and whether or not known to the
PNC, shows that significantly more male
visitors were known for previous offences
than females (χ2 = 13.681, df = 2, p =
0.01). Visitor age and whether known on
the PNC or not, did not prove a statistically
significant relationship.
6. Visitor offenders: Identifying the
serious and active, from minor
offences
Versatility of offending
Although offender self-selection is about
the ‘here and now’, that is, the action of an
individual law-breaker (eg illegal parking),
it was felt that to test the hypothesis further
— that trigger offences could uncover seri-
ous offending — that a spotlight be put on
offending visitors.  An analytical focus was
placed on trying to identify the offending
histories of visitor offenders (full details
were known for 45 out of a total of 58
visitors). The findings show that 15 were
known to the PNC for previous offences,
that is, 15 visitor offenders were found to
have a known offending history. Further
research into the background of these
follows: 
The 15 visitor offenders with an of-
fending history committed the following
offences at the YOI:
● 2 were found driving whilst disqualified
(a serious offence in itself)
● 6 committed a drugs offence (intent to
supply)
● 4 committed a motor/road traffic
offence
● 3 were wanted on warrant by another
police force.
The three visitors wanted on warrant by
other police forces, six committing drug
offences and two disqualified drivers offer
clear support for a hypothesis that offenders
visit offenders.  All can be classed as ‘active’
offenders — two for a string of car-theft
offences) whose whereabouts had been
unknown to police.
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When taken as a group, the 15 visitor
offenders were found to have varied offence
histories, providing evidence to support a
versatile offender hypothesis:
● 2 had committed previous drugs
offences
● 4 had committed offences which
included violence
● 2 had committed theft
● 4 had committed a wide array of offences
(eg theft, TOMV but not violence)
● 1 had committed criminal damage
● 2 had stolen a motor vehicle.
Frequency of offending
For this group of offending visitors it was
found that: 
● 5 had a PNC record of one or two
previous offences 
● 2 had a PNC record of three or four
offences 
● 6 had a PNC record of more than five
previous offences (for the two remaining
visitor offender the number of previous
offences was unclear). 
In total, 64 per cent of this group had
committed three or more previous known
offences, with nearly 50 per cent found to
have committed five or more prior
offences. Further analysis was conducted to
determine if any could be labelled ‘serious’
and/or ‘active’ offenders — a principal
objective of the study. 
In order to determine the extent to
which this group of visitor offenders could
be classed as active and/or serious, details of
all 15 individuals’ offending were searched
using the Lancashire Constabulary ‘Sleuth’
database, which incorporates criminal intel-
ligence as well as known offences. Analysis
was conducted alongside a senior officer,
who added his knowledge of any the
cohort. They were assessed as being either:
criminally ‘active’, ‘inactive’ or ‘unknown’.
To be classed as active a visitor offender had
to have committed an offence within the
last 18 months, or intelligence to suggest
they might have (our definition). The fol-
lowing was found:
● 7 (almost 50 per cent) were considered
active offenders
● 5 (33 per cent) were considered inactive
(ie had desisted from crime for some
reason including incarceration).
● For 3 (20 per cent) it was not possible to
class them as either of the above due to a
lack of current intelligence).
It was found that 35 per cent (n = 5) of this
group were well-known offenders, having
committed a number of previous offences,
including violence.  Additionally, the senior
officer who assisted with analysis knew all
five names instantly. Furthermore, two
showed as ‘Prolific or Priority Offenders’ (a
recent Home Office policy initiative that
police and partners target those offenders
causing most harm in their local commu-
nity) — subject to intensive scrutiny by
police and other agencies — such as pro-
bation. One received a three-year custodial
sentence for burglary and drugs offences —
arrested via Operation Visitor for possession
with intent to supply drugs. The other was
driving whilst disqualified. 
Another important research aim was
whether any specific visitor offences could
serve as offender self-selection ‘triggers’ —
those warranting further police attention —
for identifying active, serious, offenders. As
discussed above, 15 visitor offenders showed
on the PNC (and/or Sleuth). A cross-
tabulation analysis comprising the types of
offences detected by Operation Visitor and
visitor offence histories did not prove statis-
tically significant, probably due to the rela-
tively small numbers involved, but some
visitor offences did show potential for
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future offender self-selection research. For
example, six of those visitors who com-
mitted a drugs offence had committed
drugs and/or serious offences (including
violence) in the past, five of whom were
classed as ‘active’ offenders by police. Fur-
ther research is required to determine just
how reliable a self-selection trigger drugs
possession could be in identifying serious
(and prolific) offenders because, during
Operation Visitor, this was also found to be
a common first offence, particularly with
younger visitors. One must also bear in
mind that only class C drugs possession was
detected in Operation Visitor and class A
possession might be a more robust indicator
of any additional serious criminality.
Recent research focusing on DNA and
criminal histories found that those who had
committed violent crimes (including mur-
der) quite often had committed previous
drug offences (Townsley, Smith, & Pease, in
press). The use of the offence of drugs
possession with intent to supply as a self-
selection trigger therefore should be
regarded as promising, but requires further
research to establish utility and robustness. 
Akin to the above finding, specific
motor/road traffic offences as self-selection
triggers for identifying serious offenders did
not prove statistically significant, again
probably due to the sample size. However,
several offence types did show some pro-
mise. First, for example, two visitors issued
with a Fixed Penalty Notice were found to
have offending histories — one individual
for a plethora of what could be considered
serious crimes —  which supports the find-
ings of recent research on FPNs and con-
current criminality (Wellsmith & Guille,
2005). Second, two visitor offenders issued
with Vehicle Defect Rectification Notices
(VDR) were also found to have offending
histories — one being a known ‘active’
burglar. Lastly, one visitor arrested for driv-
ing whilst disqualified had committed this
same offence three times in the past, sug-
gesting that perhaps a significant number of
those committing this offence are inclined
do so persistently, as was found in a previous
study of traffic offending (Rose, 2000). 
Perhaps most importantly, Operation
Visitor identified how police use
HO/RT1s currently and how — if used in
a more systematic, targeted way — they
could be the most promising self-selection
tool for identifying active serious offenders
so far. First a brief explanation of what a
HO/RT1 is.
Police officers are permitted to order
drivers to stop if they suspect an offence is
being committed (eg a faulty brake light,
cracked number plate, etc.). After being
stopped police are entitled to see the
driver’s documents (eg driver’s licence,
MOT, etc.); if these are not to hand, police
can issue the driver with a Home Office
Road Traffic 1 (HO/RT1). The driver of
the vehicle is then legally compelled to
present his or her driving licence, Ministry
of Transport certificate (MOT), insurance
details and vehicle ownership documents at
a convenient police station, within a 28-day
period. To not do so, or to only part
produce (ie produce some but not all the
required documents) is a prosecutable
offence. HO/RT1s should therefore be
considered a useful police tool with which
to establish the identification of illegal from
legal motorists.  However, from concurrent
research, the author has found that the ‘real’
use of HO/RT1s by the police is far
from clear.
In total, 134 (64 per cent) of visitor
drivers during Operation Visitor were issued
with a notice HO/RT1. They had been
unable to produce the relevant documenta-
tion during an operation and a PNC check
had not identified a recorded offence (eg
not possessing a valid motor insurance). If
the PNC had, for example, identified them
as driving without vehicle tax or insurance,
the probable outcome would have been a
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Fixed Penalty Notice (FPN). Without dis-
crimination, all drivers who could not pro-
vide the appropriate documentation were
issued with HO/RT1s.
A sample of 44 drivers issued with
HO/RT1s during operations five and six
was taken in order to establish whether an
identifiable relationship between HO/RT1
disposal and offending history existed. The
hypothesis was that those drivers not com-
plying with HO/RT1 conditions (ie they
did not present all the required documents
within 28 days) would be those possibly
with something to hide (eg actively
engaged in crime, possibly of a serious
nature, or had given a false name). The
findings were as follows:
● In total, 75 per cent (n = 33) of visitors
complied fully with HO/RT1 require-
ments, producing all necessary documen-
tation within the allotted time period.
● However, of the remaining 25 per cent
(n = 11) 
● 6 ‘part-produced’ (ie produced some
but not all the required documents)
● 5 did not comply at all (‘no-shows’) 
● In sum, all 11 (25 per cent of all
drivers in the sample) committed a
prosecutable offence.
Emphasis was placed on whether HO/
RT1 non-compliance indicated further
criminality, by focusing on the offending
histories of this group of 11 drivers. One
driver who had not complied at all with the
HO/RT1 was identified as a known
offender, with a string of convictions for
disqualified driving and theft which had led
to custodial sentences — as recently as the
month prior. The other 10 ‘non-compliant’
drivers were not found on the PNC, but
nevertheless the 1:11 ‘hit rate’ should not be
underestimated as a potential self-selection
trigger. This is especially the case, when
concurrent research (with a larger sample
size) has found that as many as 55 per cent
of HO/RT1s issued are not fully complied
with, with little being done to identify
these offenders, some of whom will be
active serious offenders. Such initial find-
ings have led to the development of a
dedicated study of HO/RT1 use and its
potential in identifying serious active
offenders (Roach 2007, in press).
DISCUSSION
First and foremost, Operation Visitor led to
the detection of 58 offences committed by
YOI visitors, leading to 25 arrests. This in
itself has been considered a success, worthy
of continuation beyond the research period.
Indeed, significant crime prevention effects
may be had if knowledge of the operations
(but not their dates) is widely publicised.
Second, from a research perspective,
Operation Visitor has provided empirical
support to what was previously just a
notion, that offenders visit offenders (or
at least that a significant number of
prison visitors themselves have offending
histories). 
Third, with regard to the idea of offender
versatility findings support the hypothesis
that serious offenders also commit more
minor offences — motoring ones in par-
ticular — and that these might be used to
uncover them as more serious offenders.
Four visitors were wanted on warrant at the
time of the operations, their whereabouts
otherwise unknown. 
Fourth, the ratio of visitors flagged as
having offending histories (via the PNC),
compared with those not, was found to
be 1:10, higher we believe than would be
found in the wider populace and therefore
supporting our premise that this would be a
fertile group with which to learn more
about offending patterns. In particular, an
extremely high ratio of 1:6 visitor drivers
was found committing a driving/motoring
offence when compared to estimates of the
general population. Drivers were found to
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commit mainly process offences, very few
were found in possession of drugs. A sig-
nificant majority of process offences (71 per
cent) were committed by male drivers aged
31+ years, consistent with previous research
on traffic offences (eg see Rose, 2000) 
Fifth, with regard to contribution to the
offender self-selection literature, the Opera-
tion Visitor research identifies several minor
infractions which show potential as triggers
and worthy of additional research. As dis-
cussed, 15 visitors who committed a pros-
ecutable offence detected during Operation
Visitor had offending histories — some
more distant than others. It was found that
nearly 30 per cent of this group had com-
mitted offences of violence and 18 per cent
had committed drugs offences in the past,
but most had a varied offence list to some
degree.  Analysis of frequency of offending
for this group — based on offending histo-
ries — found that 50 per cent had com-
mitted five or more past offences and two
were identified as ‘prolific and priority
offenders’.
Also, as discussed, the Operation Visitor
research identifies the potential for
HO/RT1s to be used more extensively as a
self-selection tool for uncovering active
serious offenders. If, as concurrent research
has found, a significant number of individ-
uals do not comply with HO/RT1 require-
ments when issued, then the questions to be
begged are ‘why?’ and ‘what is currently
done about it?’. Our brief exploration leads
us to answer the former that it is very
possible that those individuals concerned
have something to hide (maybe of a serious
criminal nature) and the latter question
simply to our knowledge ‘not a lot’. Our
findings from Operation Visitor, however
brief, have ignited our interest in further
exploring the potential use of HO/RT1s to
identify active serious offenders.
At this juncture consideration must be
given to some of the perceived limitations
of the Operation Visitor research, namely
that it represents a relatively small study of
visitors to only one penal institution in
England. This is a fair point and it is hoped
that further research can be conducted
which incorporates a greater number of
diverse penal institutions. 
However, the aim of this research was
not to examine the behaviour of prison
visitors per se — based on the hypothesis
that prison visitors were more likely to be
past/active offenders — it was to identify
those minor offences which more serious
offenders are likely to commit. As such,
prison visitors were seen as fertile ground
on which advancement of self-selection
could grow. In this respect, the study has
been a success, but larger-scale studies are
needed, accepted.
With regard to the wider topic of offen-
der self-selection acknowledgement must
be given that many experienced and astute
police officers already have an intuitive
sense of the potential of offender self-
selection.  However, our argument is as
follows:
1. The minor offences which are chosen to
trigger special attention should be based
on research establishing the extent and
nature of links with more serious
offending. This removes subjectivity
from the enforcement process. 
2. A process should be established whereby
the intuitions of police officers are made
external and available, and tested against
the evidence.
In short, offender self-selection is not about
rediscovering one aspect of the craft of
policing. It is about evidencing and quanti-
fying links between offences of which some
experienced officers have a sense, and dis-
carding those police intuitions which are
unfounded. 
Finally, below are listed several key find-
ings (in no particular order) drawn from
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Operation Visitor and the review of the
offender self-selection literature to date:
1. More research investigating the
major–minor offence link
There are zillions of potential minor
offences which could act as markers for
serious offender identification. Vigorous
research is needed to discover the most
reliable and robust.
2. Do not underestimate the signifi-
cance of minor offences
Evidence is still growing in support of
serious offenders displaying crime versa-
tility, especially with regard to com-
mitting both serious and minor
infractions of the law. By committing
minor offences serious offenders are self-
selecting for increased police attention,
which can be used to uncover more
serious criminality. After all, Dick Turpin
was identified by prison guards reading
his mail after he had been arrested for
stealing a horse, not for highway robbery
or murder for which he was hanged.
3. It needs to be as painless as
possible
An important learning point is that any
such indicator offence needs to be both
of minimal inconvenience and justifiable
to the public. Generally people do not
object to obtrusive measures such as
being searched at a prison, provided they
understand clearly the reasons for it.
Offender self-selection is about identify-
ing those minor offences which best
indicate that more serious offending
might be present, whilst remembering
that most minor offences will be com-
mitted by minor offenders. The best
trigger offences will be the least obtru-
sive, as with the disabled bays study
where the illegal parkers were not
aware they were the subject of increased
interest. Using mobile phones while
driving and not wearing seat belts are
triggers where advice given to those
who are not involved in crime is in any
case in the driver’s best interests. The
beauty of this approach is that it does not
seek to identify via discriminatory prac-
tice, such as offender profiling, it is
focused instead on actions (ie the break-
ing of a law).
4. Give officers as much know-how as
possible
Most front-line officers have less than
five years’ experience in the service.
When the significant number of recent
recruits to the extended police family are
added, the urgent need to provide as
much know-how as possible becomes
apparent. As offender self-selection
knowledge grows it provides much nee-
ded know-how for the inexperienced.
For example, if a list of minor offences
that warrant increased perpetrator scru-
tiny can be given, this would have big
implications (eg for the application of
police resources). The illegal parking in
disabled bays study (Chenery et al.,
1999) suggests a need for a closer work-
ing relationship between police and traf-
fic wardens in order to identify ‘wanted’
and serious offenders more effectively.  It
is worth recalling that the Madrid car
bombers were stopped for a traffic
infraction while the bomb remained
undetected in the car boot. Self-
selection can save lives too.
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APPENDICES
Appendix 1: A table showing Operation Visitor dates and the number of visitors and
vehicles searched
Operation
Number
Date Day Number
of vehicles
stopped
Number
of visitors
searched
1 26/04/04 Monday 21 63
2 04/05/04 Tuesday 14 43
3 13/05/04 Thursday 26 76
4 04/06/04 Friday 18 54
5 30/09/04 Thursday 26 76
6 28/10/04 Thursday 27 69
7 11/01/05 Tuesday 16 62
8 13/01/05 Thursday 22 56
9 03/03/05 Thursday 22 62
10 19/03/05 Thursday 18 56
Total 210 617
Appendix 2: A breakdown of all offences detected during Operation Visitor
Operation
Number
Drugs Fixed
Penalty
Notices
Vehicle  Defect
Rectification
Notices
Prohibiton
Orders
(Pg9)
Others Total
number of
offences
HO/RT1
issue
1 10 3 2 1 1 × driving disqual 17 6
2 0 0 1 1 0 2 9
3 2 2 1 1 1 × driving disqual 7 12
4 0 1 4 0 2 × warrant 7 14
5 1 2 0 0 0 3 25
6 1 3 2 2 1 × warrant
3 × theft
12 23
7 0 3 0 0 1 × warrant 4 9
8 0 2 0 0 0 2 17
9 3 0 0 0 0 3 14
10 0 0 1 0 0 1 5
Total 17 16 11 5 9 58 134
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